WAR HAS RULES: A GUIDE TO PROHIBITED WEAPONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ⚖️



 WAR HAS RULES: A GUIDE TO PROHIBITED WEAPONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ⚖️


Many people assume that once war begins, anything goes. It does not. International humanitarian law (IHL), also called the law of armed conflict, limits how wars may be fought.


The Principal Principles


The right of parties to choose their means and methods of warfare is not unlimited (Hague Regulations 1907, art 22; Additional Protocol I 1977 (AP I), art 35(1)). Three rules do most of the work:


▪️ No unnecessary suffering. Weapons that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering are prohibited (AP I, art 35(2)).

▪️ No indiscriminate weapons. A weapon that cannot be directed at a military objective, or whose effects cannot be limited, may not be used (AP I, art 51(4)).

▪️ The Martens clause. Where no specific rule exists, civilians and combatants remain protected by the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience (AP I, art 1(2)).


The ICJ called these cardinal principles of humanitarian law, binding even on states that have not ratified the relevant treaties (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Rep 226, paras 78–79). The ICRC's study of customary IHL confirms the prohibitions on unnecessary suffering and indiscriminate weapons as customary rules (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, Customary IHL, Vol I (CUP 2005), rr 70–71).


Below are the Prohibited Weapons of Warfare 


1. Chemical weapons 

The 1925 Geneva Protocol banned the use of poisonous gases in war. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 1993 went further, banning the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons, and requiring destruction of stockpiles under the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (CWC, arts I and VIII).


▪️ Riot control agents: Tear gas may be used for law enforcement, but never as a method of warfare (CWC, art I(5)).

▪️ Internal conflicts:The ICTY held that the chemical weapons ban applies in non-international armed conflicts too (Prosecutor v Tadić, IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, paras 119–124).

▪️ Criminal liability: Using poison or poisonous gases is a war crime under the Rome Statute (art 8(2)(b)(xvii)–(xviii) and 8(2)(e)(xiii)–(xiv)).


2. Biological weapons 

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 1972 bans developing, producing, stockpiling and acquiring biological agents and toxins that have no peaceful, protective or prophylactic justification (art I). Their use in war is barred by the 1925 Geneva Protocol and by custom (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, r 73). Unlike the CWC, the BWC has no standing verification body, so compliance depends on national implementation (art IV).


3. Anti-personnel landmines 

A landmine cannot tell a soldier from a child, and it stays lethal long after the fighting ends. The Ottawa Convention 1997 bans their use, production, stockpiling and transfer. It requires stockpile destruction within four years and clearance of mined areas within ten (arts 1, 4 and 5). States outside it are still bound by Amended Protocol II to the CCW and by customary rules on minimising indiscriminate effects, recording minefields and clearing them after the war (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, rr 81–83).


A treaty under pressure: The Ottawa Convention reached 166 States Parties by June 2025. But Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Poland have initiated or completed withdrawal, and Ukraine has suspended its participation, citing the security threat from Russia. China, Russia and the US have never joined. Under art 20, withdrawal takes effect six months after notice, but not until the end of any armed conflict the withdrawing state is engaged in at that point.


4. Cluster munitions 

Cluster munitions scatter many small submunitions over a wide area, and the ones that fail to explode behave like landmines. The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) 2008 bans their use, production, stockpiling and transfer, and requires stockpile destruction within eight years, clearance within ten, and victim assistance (arts 1, 3, 4 and 5). According to the 2026 Cluster Munition Monitor, it has 112 States Parties and 12 signatories. Lithuania's withdrawal took effect on 6 March 2025, the first time any state has left it.




What about states outside these treaties? 

A treaty ban binds only its parties. But every state remains bound by customary IHL, including distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack (AP I, arts 51 and 57). Using cluster munitions in a populated area, for example, can be unlawful even where the weapon is not banned by treaty.


Enforcement and Nigeria 🇳🇬


States must also review new weapons for lawfulness before fielding them (AP I, art 36). Violations can give rise to state responsibility and individual criminal liability. In Nigeria, a dualist state, treaties take domestic effect only once enacted by the National Assembly (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, s 12(1)), and the Geneva Conventions are given effect through the Geneva Conventions Act, Cap G3, LFN 2004.


Conclusively, even in a state of warfare certain means and methods are prohibited. The chemical and biological weapons bans are among the most widely accepted rules in IHL. The landmine and cluster munition bans are younger and now face political strain. IHL protects people only when states ratify it, implement it and answer for breaches.


#InternationalHumanitarianLaw 

#IHL 

#LawOfArmedConflict 

#HumanRights

 #InternationalLaw

 #WarCrimes 

#IHLStudent

The Prohibition on the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations: Rhetoric or Reality?





The Prohibition on the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations: Rhetoric or Reality?

Abstract

The prohibition on the threat or use of force, enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, represents a cornerstone of modern international law, reflecting the post-1945 commitment to preventing the horrors of global conflict. This article examines the normative strength and practical effectiveness of this prohibition, exploring its foundations in treaty and customary law, recognised exceptions, and persistent challenges to enforcement. Through analysis of recent cases including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Israel’s military operations in Gaza, and US/UK strikes against Houthi targets in Yement assesses whether the norm remains operative or has been reduced to aspirational rhetoric. While the prohibition has significantly constrained interstate aggression among major powers and achieved jus cogens status, structural limitations in the UN Security Council, expansive interpretations of self-defence, and selective compliance undermine its universality. The article concludes that the norm retains substantial resilience but requires institutional reform to enhance its operational force.

Keywords: Use of force, Threat of force,  Self-Defence, Jus Cogens, Security Council Veto


1. Introduction


The regulation of force lies at the heart of international law. From Hugo Grotius’s early pleas for restraint in warfare to the post-World War II order, states have sought to limit recourse to armed violence. The UN Charter’s prohibition on the threat or use of force in Article 2(4) marked a revolutionary shift from the pre-1945 era, when states enjoyed near-unfettered discretion to wage war (jus ad bellum).Today, this prohibition is widely regarded as a peremptory norm (jus cogens) binding on all states.


Yet persistent violations raise fundamental questions about effectiveness. Major powers frequently invoke exceptions—particularly self-defence under Article 51—while the Security Council’s veto mechanism often prevents collective enforcement. This article critically evaluates whether Article 2(4) functions as an operative legal constraint or mere rhetorical aspiration. It proceeds by clarifying key concepts, outlining the legal framework, analysing recent practice, and offering recommendations for strengthening the norm.

 

Conceptual Clarification


2.1 Threat of Force

A threat of force comprises a state’s communicated intention to employ armed force unless specified demands are met. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has emphasised that not every coercive statement qualifies; the threat must involve armed force and target territorial integrity or political independence.Mere possession of weapons, including nuclear arsenals, does not constitute a prohibited threat absent specific coercive intent.


2.2 Use of Force

Article 2(4) prohibits “force” in the sense of armed or military coercion, not economic or political measures. The UN General Assembly’s Definition of Aggression (Resolution 3314) provides non-exhaustive examples, including invasion, bombardment, and blockade.The ICJ distinguishes “most grave” uses constituting armed attacks (triggering self-defence) from lesser violations of Article 2(4).


2.3 International Relations

In legal terms, “international relations” in Article 2(4) denotes interactions among sovereign states governed by international law.As an academic discipline, international relations examines patterns of cooperation and conflict among states and non-state actors through diverse theoretical lenses.


3. The Legal Framework

3.1 The UN Charter

Article 2(4) provides that, ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’.

Two explicit exceptions exist:

(a) Individual or collective self-defence under Article 51, an “inherent right” exercisable only if an armed attack occurs, subject to necessity, proportionality, and reporting to the Security Council;


(b) Security Council-authorised force under Chapter VII upon determination of a threat to or breach of the peace.

Other claimed exceptions—humanitarian intervention, responsibility to protect (R2P), or pre-emptive self-defence—lack consistent state practice and opinio juris to establish customary status.


3.2 Customary International Law and Jus Cogens


The ICJ has repeatedly confirmed that Article 2(4)’s core principle reflects customary law binding even on non-UN members. Its jus cogens character precludes derogation and renders inconsistent treaties void.


 4. Critical Analysis of Effectiveness


Article 2(4) has achieved remarkable normative success: territorial conquest has become rare, and direct great-power war absent since 1945. Yet enforcement remains uneven, particularly against permanent Security Council members.


 4.1 Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine (2022–present)


Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 manifestly violated Article 2(4). Justifications invoking self-defence, prevention of genocide, and protection of Donbas separatists were widely rejected. The UN General Assembly condemned the aggression in multiple resolutions, and the ICJ ordered provisional measures requiring immediate suspension of military operations.Russia’s veto, however, paralysed Chapter VII action, illustrating structural immunity for P5 members.


4.2 Israel’s Military Operations in Gaza (2023–present)


Israel’s response to Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attacks invoked Article 51. While the initial right of self-defence is undisputed, prolonged operations raised proportionality concerns. In South Africa v Israel, the ICJ issued repeated provisional measures under the Genocide Convention, including an order to halt military offensives in Rafah. These orders indirectly reinforce Article 2(4) scrutiny, though compliance remains contested.


4.3 US and UK Strikes against Houthi Targets (2024–present)


US and UK airstrikes on Houthi-controlled Yemen, responding to Red Sea shipping attacks, were justified as collective self-defence protecting freedom of navigation. Critics argue no armed attack attributable to Yemen occurred and that unilateral action without Security Council authorisation breached Article 2(4). The case highlights expansive interpretations of Article 51 against non-state actors.

These examples demonstrate selective applications: powerful states or their allies often evade accountability through broad self-defence claims or veto protection.


 5. Institutional and Normative Challenges

The Security Council’s veto power frequently blocks enforcement. The ICJ provides authoritative interpretation but lacks enforcement mechanisms. Emerging practice on cyber operations and non-state actors further strains traditional boundaries.


6. Recommendations

1. Limit veto use in mass-atrocity situations through voluntary restraint or General Assembly override mechanisms.

2. Clarify Article 51 boundaries, particularly regarding non-state actors and anticipatory self-defence, via General Assembly declaratory resolution.

3. Enhance ICJ compulsory jurisdiction through wider acceptance of Article 36(2) declarations.

4. Strengthen preventive diplomacy and compliance incentives, including targeted sanctions for violations.

5. Promote universal ratification of the Rome Statute to bolster individual accountability for aggression.

7. Conclusion

The prohibition on the threat or use of force retains substantial normative and practical force, having transformed interstate relations since 1945. It is neither pure rhetoric nor perfectly effective. Structural reform and restrained interpretation of exceptions are required to preserve its authority in an increasingly multipolar order.


#InternationalLaw

#UseofForce

#UNCharter 


OLAWUNI SAMUEL IDOWU.

Share

Twitter Delicious Facebook Digg Stumbleupon Favorites More